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Executive Summary

This report is intended to highlight the key issues for NFRS and all Fire and Rescue Services that arise from the New National Framework published by the government in  July 2012.
The framework raises many questions about the state of preparedness of individual Fire and Rescue Authorities in meeting their new responsibilities under the regime, as well as for the system as a whole, and we look briefly upon the state of preparedness in part 8 of the report.
The report draws notes that 
	This is the first Fire and Rescue legislation that explicitly and exclusively addresses its advice and guidance  to Fire and Rescue Authorities rather than Fire and Rescue Services or Brigades.
 
	It contains a number of onerous and open ended obligations on individual authorities and services with little guidance as to what is the appropriate standards or benchmarks against which to review and deliver the obligations.

	It proposes a hands-off, light touch and self-governing model for local FRAs when  addressing both fire and rescue and resilience issues at local and cross boundary scales. In so doing it articulates the key questions that FRAs need to ask themselves when assessing the adequacy of their services. 

	The framework clarifies and affirms the importance and centrality of the IRMP process and the need for all authorities to expedite this process and ensure it is up to date and based on contemporary data and intelligence. 

	Our research questions the validity, transparency and adequacy of the evidential base currently available to the public, the lack of an independent Fire Inspectorate and a central repository for performance information on which to base comparative evaluation.

	Although it provides no objective or subjective; absolute or relative standards or benchmarks upon which to base comparative judgements
	NBSs’ previous research has questioned the adequacy and level of development of the current Integrated Risk Management Plans to meet the obligations anticipated from them by the new regime we have revisited that research in the light of the new framework.

This review of our 2011 research has no doubt been superseded by new material and work undertaken on IRSMs since that time. We would stress that it is in no way an adequate substitute for an on-site inspection by an external inspectorate or a robust peer review. Nevertheless our review suggests that authorities still have some way to go before they can be confident that they are meeting the requirements expected of them in the new framework.
The NBS response to the governments’ recent consultation on the interventions concordat is also attached as an appendix to the report.
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1.	Introduction

1.1.	The purpose of our paper at the EM12 conference was to review the Coalition Government’s new National Framework for Fire and Rescue Services in England which was released by the DCLG in July 2012 (DCLG 2012). This presents radical changes to the previous national framework published by the Labour government in 2008 (DCLG 2008). It follows a “strategic review” of the framework that was announced by the Fire Minister in June 2010 shortly after the general election in May (DCLG 2010). 

1.2.	The paper was the latest in a series of research papers that have reviewed various parts of the new Fire and Rescue regime in England. Previous papers have looked at the emergence of the new national framework, itself, since the announcement of the review (Murphy and Greenhalgh 2010, and 2011); the preparations and implementation of the Integrated Risk Management Plans upon which both the existing and the previous regimes are predicated in practice (Murphy, et al 2012) and the proposals for support and intervention arrangements for individual Fire and Rescue Services that face difficulties in meeting their obligations under the national frameworks (Murphy, et al 2012). 

1.3.	The latest paper identified policy and delivery issues for both individual Fire and Rescue Authorities and for the national fire and rescue services. 

1.4.	Although the regime is generally consistent with the coalition government’s original stated intentions for the service (DCLG 2010, House of Commons 2011, Cabinet Office 2011), the framework raises many questions about the state of preparedness of individual Fire and Rescue Authorities in meeting their new responsibilities under the regime, as well as for the system as a whole. 

1.5.	The new system places a number of onerous and open ended obligations on individual authorities and services with little guidance as to what is the appropriate standard or benchmark against which to review and deliver the obligations.

1.6.	Neither absolute nor relative benchmarks have been established nor published. It is very unlikely that these will be established and be widely accepted unless they are centrally co-ordinated and robustly quality assured. The alternative is for individual authorities and services to attempt to develop individual evidence bases against which to assess their preparedness leading potentially to considerable duplication of effort and waste and confusion in the system.

1.7.	The new framework emphasizes the centrality and critical role of the Integrated Risk Management Plans introduced by the 2004 Act. Previous research strongly questions the adequacy and level of development of the current IRMPs to meet the obligations anticipated from them by the new regime (Murphy, et al 2012). Our paper to the conference revisited that research evidence in the light of the new framework.



2.	The new framework.

2.1.	The new framework covers England only and although it does not apply to Northern Ireland , Scotland or Wales, where responsibility for fire and rescue services is devolved, it will inevitably have an impact within these jurisdictions not least because of the similarity of the fire and other risks that services face across the UK.

2.2.	In relation to the provision of services at the local level this is the first Fire and Rescue legislation that explicitly and exclusively addresses its advice and guidance to Fire and Rescue Authorities rather than Fire and Rescue Services or Brigades. It articulates what the government expects the authorities to deliver through their services and also what it expects them to contribute to national resilience. This emphasis on authorities rather than the services reflects both the coalition government’s proposals for “Commissioned Services” outlined within the Open Public Services White Paper for the reform of public services (Cabinet Office 2011); and the provisions and objectives of the subsequent Localism Act

2.3.	The new framework sets out the Government’s key priorities for the service and differentiates the FRAs responsibilities for responding to both national  F&R and resilience issues, and suggests  proposals for “closing the gaps” in capacity and preparedness.

2.4.	It proposes a hands-off, light touch and self-governing model for local FRAs when addressing both fire and rescue and resilience issues at local or cross boundary scales. In so doing it articulates the key questions that FRAs need to ask themselves when assessing the adequacy of their services. 

2.5.	It also implicitly suggests the type of key questions that any public inquiry or judicial review might wish to address in the light of a serious emergency incident. It also lays out the support and intervention arrangements for the sector as a whole at national level.

2.6.	The remainder of this paper outlines the key questions that arise for services and comments upon them.

2.7.	The conference paper applied a desk top assessment of the questions to the Family Group 4 of Fire and Rescue Services. It also applied them in more detail to a specific service. However it is not our intention to criticise any individual service or the services as a whole. Our intention is to work with services both locally and nationally to reduce risks to individuals and communities and to improve services.

2.8.	We therefore deliberately applied our assessments to historical data on service websites (albeit only six months old) and not to current data or the current content of websites – although, we strongly suspect the findings would remain little changed.



3.	Introduction to the framework and key priorities

3.1.	In summary the framework requires FRS to identify and assess the full range of foreseeable fire and rescue related risks their areas face, (“from fires to terrorist attacks”), make provision for prevention and protection activities and respond to incidents appropriately. In order to do this efficiently and effectively they must work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally to deliver their service while at the same time being accountable to their communities for the services they provide.

3.2.	The government explicitly retains strategic responsibility for national resilience, while authorities have responsibility for local resilience albeit in collaboration with partners, as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The framework therefore reminds authorities of the National Risk Assessment process and Community Risk Registers and specifically of the need for them to plan for and respond to incidents of such scale or complexity beyond the capacity of local resources, or “mutual aid arrangements, pooling, reconfiguration and/or collective action”. It makes clear that;

3.3.	“They need to deliver effective and proportionate prevention and protection activities and be ready to respond to incidents within their areas and across the country to keep communities safe.” (DCLG 2012 p7)

3.4.	Although the 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act enabled services to respond to incidents outside of their area by order of the Secretary of State, (which services regularly do), this explicitly requires them to be ready and able to respond anywhere in the country and may require regular monitoring of risk registers or establishment of an appropriate advanced alarm or escalation system. While it is clear that local services must assist, when called in national emergencies, there is no reciprocal commitment for national assistance with local emergencies. 



4.	Safer Communities

4.1.	FRSs must identify and assess all foreseeable Fire and Rescue risks to communities and reflect them in their Integrated Risk Management Plans which cover at least a three year period. Each FRA much produce an IRMP that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plans must have regard to the National Risk Register, Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums under the Civil Contingencies Act and any other local risk analysis as appropriate. The government assumes this will then produce a “fully integrated risk assessment process”.  

4.2.	FRAs must then work with communities to identify and protect them from these risks and to prevent incidents from occurring. The IRMP must demonstrate how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to mitigate the impact on communities, through authorities working either individually or collectively, in a cost effective way. In order to do this they must set out their management strategy and programme.

4.3.	Finally in terms of emergency response FRAs must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic accidents and emergencies within their area and in other areas (in line with their mutual aid agreements), and reflect this in their IRMPs. They must have effective business continuity arrangements to meet all service delivery risks and they must collaborate with other FRAs to deliver “intra-operability”, and with resilience forums to ensure “interoperability”.

4.4.	In simple terms FRAs must ask themselves the key questions that appear in table 1. If a Fire Inspectorate, peer reviewer or external regulator, was tasked with inspecting or regulating the service we suggest that they would be obliged to adopt the following types of questions as their Key Lines of Enquiry

4.5.	
Table 1 Key Lines of Enquiry - Community Safety
Has the FRA identified all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature that could affect its community and reflected these in the IRMP? 
Has the FRA demonstrated how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to mitigate the impact of risk on their communities 
Has the FRA demonstrated that they have  robust business continuity arrangements in place and that they can deliver intra-operability and interoperability.
Does the FRA have the necessary capacity in place to manage the majority of risks that may face their areas, either individually or collectively and are they contributing appropriately to collective arrangements for national resilience?
Comment 

4.6.	Whilst we are confident that most services and authorities would meet the key “test” in Question 4, in our survey it quickly became clear that it is impossible to establish in any meaningful sense, whether authorities and services are meeting the obligations in the first three questions and it is equally clear that they were not demonstrating how they were doing so to the public. 


5.	Accountability to Communities

5.1.	Chapter 2 of the new framework deals with accountability and has three aspects; namely the IRMP process; revised scrutiny arrangements required under the framework and the availability and transparency of data and information to be provided to the public.   

5.2.	The IRMP must:
	be easily accessible and publicly available;  
	reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies, and partners;
	cover at least a three year time span and be reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary; and 
	reflect up to date risk analyses and the evaluation of service delivery outcomes. 

5.3.	The FRA must make arrangements for challenge and scrutiny so as to make their communities aware of how they can access data and information on their performance in a way that enables them to compare the performance of their fire and rescue authority with others and hold their Chief Fire Officer/Chief executive to account for delivery. Thus the questions or Key Lines of Enquiry that emerge from this chapter are contained in Table 2. 




5.4.	

Table 2 Key Lines of Enquiry – AccountabilityIs the IRMP easily accessible and publicly available?  Has public consultation been effective throughout its development and at all review stages? Does it cover at least a three year time span and is it  reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary?Does it reflect up-to-date risk analyses and the evaluation of service delivery outcomes? Are scrutiny and challenge arrangements fit for purpose?Can the FRA demonstrate that their communities are aware of how to access data and information and that this is appropriate for comparing performance?

Comment 

5.5.	As part of our research on the Nottinghamshire IRMP we believe Nottinghamshire demonstrated how it was possible (and necessary) to achieve these levels of accountability, although they do not, in our view, meet the final two obligations. However during that research we also briefly assessed the other 17 services in FG4 and found every one of the current IRMPs less well advanced than Nottinghamshire in meeting these obligations.


6.	Assurance

6.1.	Chapter 3 requires robust mechanisms to be in place to provide independent assurance both to communities and to the Government. Fire and rescue authorities must provide assurance on financial, governance and operational matters and show how they have had due regard to the expectations set out in their integrated risk management plan and the requirements of the Framework. In order to do this, fire and rescue authorities must sign off and publish an annual statement of assurance.

6.2.	In addition they must work collectively and with the FR Strategic Resilience Board to provide national resilience assurance on identification of risks, specialist capacity and how they are meeting any capacity gaps. These requirements prompt the following questions in Table 3

6.3.	

Table 3 Key Lines of Enquiry – AssuranceAre robust mechanisms in place to provide independent assurance? Do these provide assurance on financial, governance and operational matters and pay due regard to the expectations set out in their IRMP and the national framework? Is this readily available to the public in an annual statement? Is the FRA contributing to the identification of wider national and cross border risks, specialist capacity and meeting any capacity gaps?
Comment

6.4.	One key issue is clearly the validity of the independent assurance provided within the new sector led regime. In our view when considering the role of the LGA there is also the need to ensure that the public are aware that Fire and Rescue Authority members are “de facto” Local Authority Members and that Fire and Rescue Authorities are corporate members of the Local Government Association. It is misleading to imply that the LGA is in any way an  “independent regulator” or “neutral broker” when in fact it is a politically lead association of politically lead organizations – and also one that has recently closed its arms-length improvement agency and merged it with its organizational advocacy arrangements. 

6.5.	The second key issue is the transparency and robustness of the evidential base available to the public.  With the demise of the Audit Commission; the significant reduction in information on the LGID website and the absence of a dedicated inspectorate there is no single repository of comparable data available to the public.  



7.	Support and improvement to the sector

7.1.	The final chapter deals with the “context, scale and scope”. It reiterates the legislative basis for the framework and then goes on to clarify both the government’s assumptions and its intentions in terms of its support and intervention in local Fire and Rescue Authorities in the future. It confirms that the peer led collaborative arrangements supported by the LGA and CFOA at the DCLG Select Committee (House of Commons  2011) will be relied upon in future  with Government use of its intervention powers only “as a last resort” and in accordance with the Section 23 Intervention Protocol (ODPM 2004). It states that the framework will be of open ended duration but reiterates the commitment to biennial reports to parliament on the extent to which Fire and Rescue Authorities are acting in accordance with the framework. The question or KLOEs that flow from this position are included in Table 4.

Table 4 Key Lines of Enquiry - Support and ImprovementIs the proposed regime fit for purpose, in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness?Does it facilitate continuous improvement and optimise risk reduction and mitigation?Are reporting and scrutiny arrangements adequate to reassure the public and the government?Are individual and collective roles and responsibilities clear, mechanisms and techniques up to date and reporting and scrutiny arrangements acknowledged best practise?
Comment
7.2.	We provided detailed comments on these proposals in our ‘Repose to the DCLG Consultation’ on the revised protocol on government intervention (which is attached as appendix 1)



8.	High level evaluation of individual FRS against the new KLOEs 

8.1.	As part of our research on the implementation of  the IRMP process in Nottinghamshire  (Murphy et al 2012) we undertook a review of the publically available information relating to the IRMPs in the 18 Fire and Rescue Services clustered together in group 4 of the Cipfa “nearest neighbour” model. Our purpose was to review the level of detail provided to the public and the public consultation process undertaken to that time by authorities. It has to be stressed that this research was carried out late in 2011 and no doubt has been superseded by new material and work undertaken on IRSMs since that time. It is in no way an adequate substitute for an on-site inspection by an external inspectorate or a robust peer review. However following the publication of the new framework we have reassessed the services and authorities (and nearly all of the information is provided by the services rather than the authorities) against the 14 questions articulated in Tables 1-3 above. 

8.2.	We adopted a simple scoring system and allocated a point for each KLOE were the particular requirement is fully met; and half a point where it is partially met or there are two aspects to the KLOE and one is met and the other is not (such as in 3 out of the 4  assurance KLOEs).

8.3.	It quickly becomes apparent that a considerable amount of work and information may have been done but is not readily available to the public. We did not however exercise our rights to make requests under the Freedom of Information Act.

8.4.	Nevertheless it may be an indication of how much the IRMP process remains a work in progress that the best score for any service/authority at that time was 7½ out of a possible 14; the next best was 5 and the average was around 3. Our scoring has, if anything, erred on the generous side.



9.	Conclusions

9.1.	The new framework generally meets the coalition governments stated intention of developing a sector lead commissioned service. It also differentiates appropriate responsibilities for Fire and Rescue Authorities at both national and local levels. It articulates what the government expects of local FRAs in terms of their democratic overview and scrutiny of local service delivery and their contribution to local and national resilience obligations. While it is clear that local services must assist, when called in national emergencies, there is no reciprocal commitment for national assistance with local emergencies. 

9.2.	The framework clarifies and affirms the importance and centrality of the IRMP process and the need for all authorities to expedite this process and ensure it is up to date and based on contemporary data and intelligence. Although it provides no objective or subjective; absolute or relative standards or benchmarks upon which to base comparative judgements it provides a delivery timescale and clear challenges to local services in both meeting their safety and resilience obligations and in communicating their activity and performance to the government and to the public.

9.3.	Our research, although based on only 18 Services and reliant on historical data, nevertheless suggests that authorities still have some way to go before they can be confident that they are meeting all of the requirements expected of them in the new framework.  

References

Cabinet Office 1998 Enforcement Concordat HMSO London
Cabinet Office 2011 Open Public Services White Paper Cmnd  8145 HMSO London
DBREE 2007 Statutory Code of practise for Regulators Better Regulation Unit DBREE HMSO ISBN 978-0-85605-712-0
DCLG 2008  Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2008–11, HMSO, London.  ISBN: 978-1-4098-0013-2
DCLG 2010 Leading a lean and efficient fire and rescue service, Fire Minister Bob Neill’s speech to the Fire and Rescue 2010 Conference , Harrogate, England, available at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/speeches/fire/frsco (​http:​/​​/​www.communities.gov.uk​/​speeches​/​fire​/​frsco​)    
DCLG 2012 Fire and rescue national framework for England HMSO ISBN: 978-1-4098-3569-1
House of Commons 2011 Communities and Local Government Committee - Fourth Report Audit and inspection of local authorities (accessed 7th November 2012 available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmcomloc/763/76302.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.publications.parliament.uk​/​pa​/​cm201012​/​cmselect​/​cmcomloc​/​763​/​76302.htm​) 
ODPM 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act HMSO London 
ODPM 2005  Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 HMSO London (accessed 7th November 2012 available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/guidance1enforcement2005 (​http:​/​​/​www.communities.gov.uk​/​publications​/​fire​/​guidance1enforcement2005​) 
MURPHY, P. and GREENHALGH, K., 2010. The performance management regime for fire and rescue services in an era of austerity. JUC Public Administration Committee Annual Conference, Nottingham Conference Centre, Nottingham Trent University, 6-8 September 2010.
MURPHY, P. and GREENHALGH, K., 2011. Creating the new national framework for fire and rescue services. JUC Public Administration Committee Annual Conference, International Conference Centre, Birmingham, 5-6 September 2011.
MURPHY, P., GREENHALGH, K. and PARKIN, C., 2012. Fire and rescue service reconfiguration: a case study in Nottinghamshire. International Journal of Emergency Services, 1 (1) pp 86-94.
MURPHY, P., GREENHALGH, K., and COLEMAN, P. 2012 The development of new support and intervention arrangements for fire and rescue services, in Alternative Futures Conference, Chaucer Building, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, 9 March 2012, 


APPENDIX 1

Nottingham Business School
International Centre for Public Services Management
Emergency Services Research Unit






Response to Department of Communities and Local Government  Consultation: 
Revised Protocol on government intervention action on fire and rescue authorities in England 
(Under Section 23 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004).

November 2012






Introduction
Nottingham Business School established an independent research programme relating to the National Framework for fire and rescue services shortly after the  them Fire Minister Bob Neill, announced the Strategic Review of the 2008-2011 National Framework in June 2010. 
One of the two work streams in Project 3 of this programme is directly assessing the Section 22 Intervention Protocol in the light of a wider evaluation of support and intervention arrangements for Fire and Rescue Services and for other locally delivered public services.
The outcomes of the research have regularly been reported inter alia to the annual conferences of the Institution of Fire Engineers entitled “Fire-Related Research and Developments” (held at the Fire Service College – most recently on 15th November 2012) and the annual conference of the JUC “Public Administration Committee”. (2010-2012). A representative selection of the working papers, academic and professional articles and conference presentations associated with the programme, are listed in the appendix A to this response. 
The programme will form an Impact Case Study from Nottingham Business School to be submitted to the 2014 Research Excellence Framework assessment of the Higher Education Funding Council. 

The NBS Fire and Rescue Research Programme consists of 3 inter-related projects:-

  •Project 1 – The New National Framework - This project continues to respond to the coalition governments’ review of the National Framework for Fire and Rescue Services with recommendations and suggestions for the new regime. The next stage of this project will focus on delivery arrangements in the new regime, the roles for the FRS sector and individual services, and how to facilitate mitigations of risk and continuous improvement in services. 
• Project 2 The implementation of the IRMPs’ in Practise - This project evaluates the introduction of the Integrated Risk Management Planning process and the resultant reconfigurations of Fire and Rescue Service in the new era of financial austerity at the Fire Authority or individual service level. The research team recently collaborated with Nottinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service on the implementation of its “Fire Cover Review”. This reappraised the authorities’ IRMP and informed the short term reconfiguration of services across the authority that  resulted from re-evaluations of current risks.
The next stage involves the review of risks in the medium and longer term, their articulation in the next stage of the IRMP and the evidential base for the medium and long term review of services and strategy.
•Project 3.  The Support and Intervention Regime. This project consists of two complementary work streams. The first is an appraisal of previous arrangements and the current proposals for the support and intervention regime anticipated by the new national framework for fire and rescue services. This looks not only at arrangements for the Fire and Rescue services but also previous and current arrangements for Local Authorities, in the Health Service (and particularly the current regime for Foundation Hospital Trusts which is the responsibility of MONITOR), criminal Justice interventions (particularly of Crime and Reduction Partnerships) and corporate and service support and intervention regimes in other individual services such as Education and Social Care.  
The second work stream has been looking specifically and in more detail, at the content of the Section 23 Intervention Protocol which is required by the 2004 Act and is the subject of the current consultation exercise. Our latest progress was reported to the Fire-Related Research and Developments conference on the 15th November where we were able to canvass attendees on a number of our interim views prior to submitting this response to the current consultation.

Response to Consultation Questions
In order to respond fully to the consultation it is necessary to make multiple references to the “New National Framework for fire and rescue services” (NNF), the  “Revised  Protocol on government action on fire and rescue authorities in England” (RP) and the LGA led publication “Sector-led improvement in Local Government” (SLI) published in July 2012. We apologize for using these acronyms.

Question 1: Does the draft protocol clearly set out what is expected of the Government and the fire and rescue authorities in their respective roles in the event of intervention by the Secretary of State?
There are a areas where we think clarity is necessary and areas were are of the view that more clarity is desirable. 
a)	Distinction between Services and Authorities: 

One issue that has emerged from our research that is generic to several issues within the NNF, the RP and the SLI is the distinction that the government has made (and allocated responsibilities accordingly) between the Fire and Rescue Authorities and the Fire and Rescue Services. 
This is the first Fire Act that addresses itself, directly and exclusively, to Fire and Rescue Authorities rather than Fire Brigades and/or Fire Services or combinations of all three. This itself is not made clear in either the NNF or the RP and was consistently overlooked by FRS in their reading of both of the new proposals. It is also clear that the distinction has been lost on key stakeholders and the general public. 
When we have  pointed out or emphasized this distinction within our presentations to key stakeholder groups - defined in our studies as the Public; the Business Community; the key local Delivery Partners (such as Local Resilience Forum members or Crime and Reduction Partnership members) and the Representative Bodies within the Service - then their immediate responses has been very consistent.
The first response is to say that the roles and relationships should be made clear across all of the guidance.
The second response is to point out that all the available evidence suggest that there are high levels of public confidence and support  in Fire and Rescue Services but low levels of visibility and confidence in Fire Authorities. This confidence has tended to decline significantly in our experience when the distinctions are made clear across all of the four groups referred to above. The FRS themselves believe that over many years, they have built a very strong reputation and “brand” with the public and stakeholders and point out that Fire Authorities like Local Authorities or Police Authorities do not share the same levels of confidence.     
 Similarly they believe some other relationships should also be made clearer. Although the proposed approach to the service and the relationship between the Fire Authority and the Fire and Rescue Service, as implied within the NNF, appears to be a relationship modeled on the  “Commissioned Service” model defined in the Open Public Services White Paper of July 2011 – this is neither explicitly stated in the NNF or the RP and they point out that Fire and Rescue Services are barely mentioned in that Open Public Services White Paper and are not identified as an example of a “Commissioned Service”. This suggests some further explicit clarifications are necessary in terms of both local and national Fire and Rescue Service delivery and in terms of ensuring clear roles in both preparedness and response in local and national resilience.   
When considering the role of the LGA there is also the need to ensure that the public are aware that Fire and Rescue Authority members are “dei facto” Local Authority Members and that Fire and Rescue Authorities are corporate members of the Local Government Association. When considering the role of the LGA they consider it to be misleading to imply that the LGA is in any way an  “independent regulator” or “neutral broker” when in fact it is a politically lead association of politically lead organizations – and also one that has recently closed its arms-length improvement agency and merged it with its organizational advocacy arrangements. 

b)	Relationship between use of powers of intervention under paragraph 15 of Local Government Act 1999 and use of powers of intervention under section 22 of the Fire and Rescue Act 2004 (paragraph 7 of PP).

The existing protocol suggests that there were situations where the government thought that the act did not make provision for intervention in FRS and where intervention might be needed but is not covered by the 1999 Act (resilience in the  face of a terrorist attack being the possible example quoted). The current paragraph does not give us  any idea of when and where one may be appropriate and when and where the other may be appropriate. There will clearly be situations where one or other  is appropriate or situations where both could be appropriate or where neither is appropriate.   It may be that this can be clarified within footnotes or in an annex and it may be  sufficient to define parameters or provide examples but at the moment the reader is left uninformed and potentially confused.  

Question 2: Is there anything you would change?
a)	Reliance on the SLI and its contents 

As currently written the RP is heavily dependent on the SLI from the LGA . Paragraph 3 of the RP gives no explicit assurance or way of scrutinizing that the political (LGA?) and professional leadership will put in place “processes to ensure that sector led support is provided to any fire and rescue authority that needs it”. The SLI is not a statutory document or government policy, nor is it subject to statutory consultation procedures and is clearly subject to change. The SLI appears to give no commitment to public consultation, as opposed to consultations with LGA members. Whilst the SLI includes some key principles with which we would agree, it also  is committed to  some to which we would not agree such as ”we all continue to lobby for further reductions in inspection, assessment and data reporting” (page 4). 
Whilst this may (or may not), reflect the situation in some local government services this is not the case in all services. In our contention it is not the case in relation to the Fire and Rescue Services or in relation to national and local resilience co-ordination – particularly in the latter case where capacity in the sector has been significantly reduced In the recent past. 
Similarly while councils may be “primarily accountable to local communities (not the government or the inspectorates)” in our view they also have clear responsibilities to both the general tax payer and to communities affected by services provided outside of their individual administrative boundaries. The LGA document makes no explicit commitment to either of them.
We suggest that this part of the protocol be amended to provide assurance that  appropriate process will be put in place based upon principles that are demonstrably appropriate to the Fire and Rescue Service at local and national levels and that are publicly contestable and open to scrutiny. 
Similarly in paragraph 5, while we agree that arrangements should be in place  and preventative improvement support provided by appropriate agencies, we consider this should include a statutory obligation to ensure these processes are published, reflect best practice, are up to date and are available to public scrutiny. This is currently the case with Monitor in the NHS, and with various government agencies and inspectorates who undertake similar roles in other public services.  
b)	Circumstances leading to statutory intervention

Paragraph 14 of the RP refers to corporate governance investigation when the  1999 Act refers to Corporate Governance Inspection. We note that the last time that Corporate Inspection was used in the Local Government Sector, (the RP accepts that it has never been used in Fire and Rescue Services), was in 2005 at Lincolnshire County Council and that the inspection was under the auspices of the Audit Commission. A Corporate Governance Inspection (or investigation) is clearly different and can be much wider than an operational or service inspection (or investigation) yet the only reference in paragraph 14 is to operational performance.  As written therefore there is currently  no provision for a strategic or a multi-agency or a cross boundary inspection/intervention which may at times be necessary. We believe these paragraphs should be changed to reflect the full range of possible scenarios.

Question 3: Is there anything not included in the protocol that should be added?
a)	Assurance on the quality reliability and public availability of data and information
 
Although paragraph 9 states that “Information sharing arrangements are in place between the LGA, government departments, and any other bodies to ensure that the LGA has the best possible intelligence to focus support”, it is difficult to see how the public can be assured of this without open access to either data and/or protocols. 
The NNF requires authorities to make their communities aware of how they can access data and information on their performance, as communities “need to be able to able to access data and information in a way that enables them to compare the performance of their fire and rescue authority with others”. Our survey of individual FRS websites and  FRA websites and the LGA website finds that this is clearly not the case almost 6 months after the publication of the NNF – in fact there has been very little increase or improvement in the amount off robust comparative performance data since the NNF was published.
 We suggest appropriate assurance is unlikely to be achieved without a publically available, remote access, real time, central repository of performance information commissioned by the department and made statutorily available. We believe that it would be expedient to do this immediately in practice before the historical records of the Audit Commission are transferred to the National Archives. We accept that there will clearly be circumstances when confidential or sensitive information is excepted. However our research suggests that in the absence of an Independent Fire Inspectorate with information sharing infrastructure, the Fire Services College and/or the Emergency Services College are more appropriate centers’  for this central repository than the LGA, and that they are more likely to command public stakeholder and wider sector confidence. 
a)	What happens upon statutory intervention

Paragraph 20 describes what happens in the period up to the drawing up of a recovery plan - with or without encouragement of outside help in the drawing up of that plan. The RP currently appears to provide no information as to the assessment of the adequacy of the plan, the implementation of the plan, or the monitoring arrangements for ensuring turnaround and/or recovery of the actual organization, service or services. There are now many models and much established good practice in the corporate turnaround and recovery of public authorities and services within the UK. For example the Lead Official/Government Monitoring Board model for Local Authorities that operated between 2001 and 2010 or the various models in the Health Sector. The only provisions in the RP at present are in paragraphs 23 and 24 and these are to reduce or condense the procedures outlined in the paragraphs above, rather than to complement them. We consider this “post- commissioning of a plan” part of the Intervention process needs developing and articulating in the RP.  
Summary
While the NBS research team generally accepts and supports the sector led approach we consider that there are an number of inadequacies or gaps in the current proposals for the RP that need to be addressed and/or improved if the system is to facilitate (and preferably optimize) continuous improvement and maintain the confidence of the public though open and transparent operation, governance, accountability and public reporting. We accept that some of these issues are wider than the revised RP but would argue that they are inter-connected with the NNF and the RP. 
Although some suggestions represent significant changes we do believe that they are relatively easily addressed as the F&R sector is clearly supportive of the general agenda and fortunately the majority of the infrastructure already exists to deliver the new system, or can be quickly developed and rapidly deployed.
In summary we are concerned that the current proposal do not clearly and demonstrably incorporate sufficient  robust independent assurance as to the economy, efficiency and effectiveness  of the NNF as a whole and the operation of Statutory Intervention RP. Neither do we believe it represents adequate and demonstrable transparency and reporting to the general public. Whilst it is not clear to us whether the individual and collective reporting to central government is fit for the purposes proposed in the NNF and in the RP, we are cognizant of the Secretary of States powers to require information and to condense the proposed process in exceptional circumstances.
We are, of course, happy to discuss the contents of this representation or to  assist in the further development of the Protocol or indeed the NNF.


Ends


This response has been submitted on behalf of the International Centre for Public Services Management and the Emergency Services Research Unit of Nottingham Trent University.
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